The Lvov-Warsaw School

Edited volumes and special issues

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The Lvov-Warsaw School and Anglo-American Analytic Philosophy

Editors: Anna Brożek, Dariusz Łukasiewicz, & Joseph Ulatowski

(in preparation)

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An anthology of work that explores the connections between the Lvov-Warsaw School and Anglo-American Analytical Philosophy. The works that comprise this volume were a part of a conference that took place at the Kazimierz Wiekl University in Bydgoszcz, Poland in October 2024.

Articles/Chapters

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Rational Cognition and Approximate Truth in the Lvov-Warsaw School

In Rationality of Rationalism(s): On Communicable Truths and Testable Knowledge, edited by Konrad Werner (Springer, forthcoming)

with Cory Wright

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The Lvov-Warsaw School’s logistic anti-irrationalism—particularly in the works of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Izydora Dąmbska, and Jan Woleński—offered an intellectually distinct alternative to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. However, its attempt to critique the Franco-German currents of mysticism and romanticism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially in the works of Henri Bergson, open it up to the question of whether its members fully appreciated the consequences of accepting that rational cognition is abstract and schematic. We argue that the abstract nature of rational cognition provides reasons to countenance approximate truth; but doing so may have revisionary consequences for the conception of scientific knowledge. These consequences point to a new direction for research about the achievability of certain ambitious goals of the Lvov-Warsaw School’s logistic anti-irrationalism.

Charity and Intentionality in Twardowski's Critique of Relative Truth

Актуальні проблеми розуму (forthcoming)

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On Brentano’s notion of intentionality the characteristic mark of mental phenomenon is its having an object. Accordingly, so do judgements. Impersonal judgments like “It is raining” lack any subject term in the usual sense. What Brentano thought was essential for impersonal judgments to be true involved the acceptance or rejection of something by someone. This allows for impersonal judgments to be relatively true and false since “It is raining” may be true at one time and place but not at another.  Kazimierz Twardowski, a student of Brentano, argued for an absolute concept of truth.  On Twardowski’s view judgments were the bearers of truth, so he dispenses with Brentano’s overly psychologised truth-concept. To supplement Twardowski’s absolute conception of truth he put some purchase in the speaker’s intentions and speaker meaning. In this paper, I show that an integral but often overlooked part of Twardowski’s absolute view of truth and his critique of relative truth is the principle of charity.

Dąmbska's Precisification of Absolute Truth through the Concept of Language 

Studies in East European Thought (forthcoming)

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Izydora Dąmbska has argued that since the concept of language is constructed within a language, the concept of truth cannot be exhausted by a choice between the different theories of truth, i.e., correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic. The aim of this paper is to show how Dąmbska’s distinction between the concept and property of truth gives rise to an absolute notion of truth. To achieve this aim, I begin with a brief history of the problem of truth in the Lvov-Warsaw School in Section 2. In Section 3, I turn to a discussion of the women philosophers in the Lvov-Warsaw School who gave novel analyses of the nature of truth. This section permits me to turn to Dąmbska’s concept of language and how that concept paves the way for a clear distinction between the concept and property of truth. Given that Dąmbska’s work does this, we see relatively immediately how an absolute notion of truth may arise from that distinction and how she carries on the tradition of defending truth against relativistic encroachment.

Maria Ossowska and the Science of Morality: A Forgotten Giant of Experimental Philosophy?

In Forgotten Giants in the History and Philosophy of Science, edited by Joanna Papiernik et al (2026) xxx-xxx.

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Maria Ossowska wrote extensively on moral philosophy, and much of her work has focused on the foundations of moral philosophy, including its psychological and sociological aspects. From the turn of the twenty-first century a branch of experimental philosophy has investigated moral intuitions, judgements, and behaviours using social scientific methods and data to substantiate, challenge, or ameliorate claims of moral philosophy. When we look at Ossowska’s contributions to what she called the science of morality, we cannot help but see the overlapping similarities between her own research programme and the empirical work that has been undertaken by moral psychologists and experimental philosophers. In my contribution to this volume, I aim to compare Ossowska’s vision of the science of morality with experimental moral philosophy and to argue that given the commonalities between them, Ossowska is a Forgotten Giant whose contribution to philosophy paved the way for moral psychology and experimental moral philosophy to become what it is today.

Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss

In Uncovering Facts and Values, edited by Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska and Adrian Kuźniar. (Brill Publishers, 2016), pp. 67-90. 

 

Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that may be buttressed by an examination of the ordinary person’s views of truth. Then, I address a concern raised by Tarski’s contemporaries who saw Næss’ results as refuting Tarski’s semantic conception. Following that, I summarize Næss’ results. Finally, I will contend with a few objections that suggest a strict interpretation of Næss’ results might recommend an overturning of Tarski’s theory.

Tarski's 1944 Polemical Remarks and Næss' 'Experimental Philosophy'
Erkenntnis (2016) 81.3: 350-382

with Robert Barnard

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Tarski identifies two primary conditions for a successful definition of truth: formal correctness and material (or intuitive) adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Tarski's thinking about material adequacy, and whether components of his view developed over time. More precisely, we are concerned with how Tarski's understanding of the content of the common-sense, every-day usage of truth may have developed over time. We distinguish this concern from the character of the extensional criterion of adequacy Tarski proposes: that a materially adequate definition must entail all instances of Convention T. We will develop our reading of Tarski as follows: first, we will review the "Polemical Remarks," focusing primarily on §§14 and 17, and Tarski's references to Naess' empirical research. Next, we will provide a summary and discussion of Naess' work, especially his findings with respect to Tarski's definition of truth and his research that suggests there is no single common or everyday concept of truth. Third, we will consider several possible objections to our interpretation of the Tarski-Naess dialectic. We will conclude that Tarski's conception of what the material adequacy requirement develop over time, potentially because of what he had learned through his interactions with Naess.