Books:

• Why Facts Matter (in preparation)

• The Socratic Classroom (w/ Robert Colter; in preparation)

• Commonsense Pluralism about Truth: An Empirical Defence. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
   

Edited volumes:

• .Australasian Philosophical Review, featuring Gila Sher (curated with Aaron Griffith, David Kashtan, and Cory Wright, forthcoming).

• Virtue, Narrative, and the Self: Explorations in Autobiography and the Philosophy of Mind and Action. (edited with Liezl van Zyl) London: Routledge, 2020.

• Minimalism about Truth: A Special Issue (edited with Cory Wright). Synthese 195.3 (2018): 927-1138.
   

Journal articles:​

• Help! Virtue Profiles and Horses for Courses. (with David Lumsden) Australasian Philosophical Review (forthcoming).

• Rational Cognition and Approximate Truth in the Lvov-Warsaw School. (with Cory Wright) In Konrad Werner... (forthcoming).

• Future Intentions, Planning, and the Problem of Buridan's Ass. Academia Letters 1686. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1686. 

• Self as One and Many Narratives. Balkan Journal of Philosophy (2021) 13(1): 11-20.

• The Objectivity of Truth, A Core Truism? (with Robert Barnard) Synthese 198 Suppl2 (2021): S717-S733.

• Missing in Action: Exposing the Moral Failures of Universities that Desert Researchers Facing Court-Ordered Disclosure of Confidential Information.  (with Ruth Walker) Educational Philosophy and Theory 53.5 (2021): 536-547.

• Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8.10 (2020): 1-18.

• What Is It Like To Be Immortal? Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 16.62 (2019): 65-77.

• The Anthropocentrism of the Cosmic Perspective Argument. (with Seth Sivinski) Ethics and the Environment 27.1 (2019): 1-18.

• Is There A Commonsense Semantic Conception of Truth? Philosophia 46.2 (2018): 487-500. 

• One Self Per Customer? From Disunified Agency To Disunified Selves. (with David Lumsden) Southern Journal of Philosophy 55.3 (2017): 314-335.

• The Inaccuracy of Partial Truths in Yablovian If-Thenism. Australasian Philosophical Review 1.2 (2017): 206-211

• Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss. In Uncovering Facts and Values, Special Issue of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and Humanities, v. 107, eds. Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska and Adrian Kuzniar. (2016): 67-90.

• Tarski's 1944 Polemical Remarks And Næss' 'Experimental Philosophy'. (with Robert Barnard) Erkenntnis 81.3 (2016): 350-382.

• On The Expertise Defence Of Armchair Philosophy, Southwest Philosophical Studies 36 (2015): 71-77.

• Truth, Correspondence, And Gender. (with Robert Barnard) Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4.4 (2013): 621-638.

• What Should We Make Of 'Drowning Man'? Southwestern Philosophical Review 28.2 (2012): 25-29.

• Act Individuation: An Experimental Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3.2 (2012): 249-262.

• Fixing The Default Position In Knobe's Competence Model. (with Justus Johnson) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33.4 (2010): 352-353.

• Intuitions And Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited. (with Shaun Nichols) Mind & Language 22.4 (2007): 346-365.

• A Conscientious Resolution of The Action Paradox On Buridan's Bridge. Southwest Philosophical Studies 25 (2003): 85-94.

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Book Chapters:

• Alethic Primitivism, from an Empirical Point of View. In Experimental Philosophy of Language: Perspectives, Methods, and Prospects, edited by David Bordonaba. Dordrecht: Springer (forthcoming).

• Experimental Philosophy. In The Cambridge Handbook of Analytical Philosophy, edited by Marcus Rossberg. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

• How Self-Narratives and Virtues Cause Action (with David Lumsden). In Virtue, Narrative, and the Self: Explorations of Character in the Philosophy of Mind and Action, edited by Joseph Ulatowski and Liezl van Zyl, pp. 69-90. London: Routledge, 2020.

• Virtue, Narrative, and Self: An Introduction (with Liezl van Zyl). In Virtue, Narrative, and the Self: Explorations of Character in the Philosophy of Mind and Action, edited by Joseph Ulatowski and Liezl van Zyl, pp. 1-18. London: Routledge, 2020.

• Do People Really Think That ⸢φ⸣ Is True If And Only If φ? (with Robert Barnard) In Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, edited by Andrew Aberdein and Matthew Inglis, pp. 145-172​. London: Bloomsbury, 2019.

• Thinking About the Liar, Fast and Slow. (with Robert Barnard and Jonathan Weinberg) In Reflections on the Liar, ed. Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 39-70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

• The Duplicity Of Online Behavior. In Social Media and Living Well, eds. Berrin Beasley and Mitchell Haney, pp. 124-149. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

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Critical Notices:

• Casting Light Upon The Great Endarkenment. (with David Lumsden) Metaphilosophy (2019): 729-742.

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Memorial Notices:

• Dale Jacquette (1953-2016), In Memoriam. Polish Journal of Philosophy 10:1 (2017): 1

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​Pedagogy:

• "Schema" in Theories of Truth. Academia Letters, Article 149 (2021): 1-4.

• The Unexamined Student is not Worth Teaching. (with Robert Colter) Educational Philosophy and Theory 49.14 (2017): 1367-1380.

• Breaking the Language Barrier: Using Translations for Teaching Introductory Philosophy. (with Carmen Adel) AAPT Studies in Pedagogy, volume 3: Inclusive Pedagogies, ed. Kelly Burns (2017): 33-52.

• Social Dexterity in Inquiry and Argumentation: An Apologia of Socrates. (with Robert Colter) AAPT Studies in Pedagogy, volume 2: Teaching Plato, ed. Robert Loftis (2016): 6-27.

• Freeing Meno's Slave Boy: Scaffolded Learning in the Philosophy Classroom. (with Robert Colter) Teaching Philosophy 38.1 (2015): 25-49.

• What's Wrong with this Picture? Teaching Ethics through Film to High School Students. (with Robert Colter) Teaching Philosophy 36.3 (2013): 253-270.